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1. Introduction
Christina Pontoppidan’s paper has two different parts, a destructive one and a constructive one.
In the first part she aims to demonstrate that Stephen Toulmin’s model of argument, so heartily
embraced (and employed) by many rhetoricians, is in fact still a much more logical than
rhetorical model. In the second part she develops instead what she regards as a truly rhetorical
model of the process of creating a persuasive argument. Although this model is much less a
revision than a replacement of Toulmin’s model, both have more in common than it would seem.
2. Toulmin and the topics
Pontoppidan is certainly right in observing that Toulmin’s structural model, in spite of the book’s
title promising to investigate the uses of argument, still works rather as a tool for evaluating the
soundness of given arguments than as practical instruction on how to build arguments, and has
hence not really essentially detached itself from the classical background of formal logic. She
rightly points to the basically logical vocabulary Toulmin uses.
Toulmin himself, however, was convinced that he had rediscovered “the topics of
Aristotle’s Topics.” It is probably no coincidence that in the same period also other scholars
(such as most prominently Chaïm Perelman & Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958; see Warnick,
2000) began to turn the dialectical Aristotle of the Topics against the syllogistic Aristotle of the
Analytics. Yet Pontoppidan insists that Toulmin actually missed the real rhetorical and inventive
potential of Aristotle’s Topics. Based on work by Christopher Tindale (2007), she differentiates
between the dialectical use of topics in the Topics (which was the one that mainly appealed to
Toulmin) and their rhetorical employment in the context of the Rhetoric.
However, it is not quite so easy to discern between a dialectical and a rhetorical concept
of topics in Aristotle. In fact, Aristotle already sets his Topics a double task: It is meant to be
useful both as an instruction on how to find and construct good and efficient arguments and as a
means for testing other people’s arguments for soundness (ch. 2, 101a25-b4). Moreover, it never
gets entirely clear if Aristotle regarded a topos as a precast argument scheme or rather as a
particular premise of some kind. The latter seems to be implied when we learn that what a
debater needs to do in a dialectical exchange is first define the conclusion to be reached (as a rule
the contradictory of the opponent’s claim) and then work logically backwards to find appropriate
premises from which the intended result can be successfully deduced. But since these premises
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need to secure approval from the opponent, they must be éndoxa (opinions that have the approval
of a majority of people or of the best experts or of a majority thereof). In other words, they must
represent some common ground between the arguers.
Notoriously, Aristotle never defines his notion of topos in the Topics. The closest he ever
comes to a definition is in the Rhetoric, Book II chapter 26: “a topos is a heading under which
many enthymemes fall.” (Rhet. 1403a18-19, Trans. Kennedy, 1991, p. 214). This, however,
sounds more like the definition of an argument scheme than a place where to go to find
arguments (even less so an advice where to place an argument, as Pontoppidan, p. 6, seems to
insinuate). It is only Cicero who is more explicit on loci being “places from which arguments can
be retrieved,” and not only in the passage from De oratore cited by Pontoppidan (p. 5, the
precise reference is De or. II, 41, 174), but also in his own Topica (sedes, e quibus argumenta
promuntur, Topica 7; cf. Leff, 1983), where he attributes this view also to Aristotle; whether
rightly so, we cannot tell.
Hence, Pontoppidan may be right in accusing Toulmin of having missed the creative or
heuristic potential of the topics as a method to find and build persuasive arguments. But this he
could probably only have found in Cicero (or, for that matter, Quintilian), yet not really in
Aristotle, not even in the Rhetoric. For the list of topical enthymemes that Aristotle presents in
Rhetoric II 23 is again an inventory of formal argument schemes (or inference warrants in
Toulminian parlance; see Braet, 2005). And it may be misleading to cite Aristotle’s famous
definition of rhetoric as the art of “discovering the available means of persuasion” (1355b); this
may easily be a (very popular) mistranslation, since the Greek verb in question is theōrēsai,
which might better be translated as “contemplating theoretically” than “discovering.” It may
refer to the stipulated epistemological rank of rhetoric as a theorizable art rather than to an
inventive process.
Toulmin may therefore after all not have misrepresented his topical Aristotle all that
much.
3. The ‘rhetorical’ model
All this, of course, does not in the least tell against the merits of Pontoppidan’s own alternative
model of rhetorical invention expounded in the second part. Differently from Toulmin’s, it works
exclusively with clearly rhetorical concepts such as ‘standpoint’, ‘common ground’ and ‘proof’.
It defines persuasion as the ultimate aim of rhetorical argument, and audience orientation as its
essential feature (for which Tindale’s most relevant book of 2015 could have been cited along
with his 2007 paper). In that context it may be noted that the omission of a premise is by no
means “a defining feature” of Aristotle’s concept of the enthymeme (p. 6); it is just a possibility
recommended in the interest of not boring one’s audience. Moreover, Wenzel’s observation
(1987) that a rhetorical perspective would regard arguing as a persuasive process (as opposed to
a product or procedure) is interpreted as also applying to the process of building an argument,
which may be an extension of what Wenzel originally had in mind.
Pontoppidan’s model starts from a persuader’s “standpoint”, i.e., the view the persuader
firmly commits himself to. This is quite like what Kenneth Burke may have meant by “truth”
(1931, p. 212), or what Joachim Knape, in deliberate orthographical distortion of a Latin term,
has called the orator’s “zertum” (2000, p. 76). Without a standpoint, no “rhetorical situation”
(Bitzer, 1968) or “rhetorical case” (Knape, 2000, p. 76) will come about in the first place. It may
be disputable, though, if ancient stasis theory is the best guidance for finding one’s standpoint,
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since it was essentially devised for courtroom speeches and is not always easily applicable to
other kinds of oratory. Yet standpoints may be of various kinds, depending on (as Toulmin might
have said) “fields of argument”.
Next, from audience orientation it follows that the persuader must search for common
ground shared between audience and persuader in order to be persuasive. Modern cognitive
theory has spoken of the requirement that speaker and audience must share “cognitive
environments” in order to enable persuasive communication (Sperber & Wilson, 1986). This is a
modern adaptation of Aristotle’s concept on éndoxa in the Topics. Basing their arguments on
éndoxa is a point the dialectician and the rhetorician have in common over against the scientist.
Pontoppidan’s graphic model obviously allows for a plurality of common grounds,
depending on a plurality of different audiences. That means that a good persuader will adapt his
or her argument to the best common ground available in any given situation in the face of any
given audience. This is perhaps the moment where topoi may help most. Yet the lists of topoi
Pontoppidan mentions in that context are heterogeneous. On the one hand (p. 8), she cites
Aristotle’s télē or “ends” specific to each genre of speech and the ultimate “ends” of all
argumentation that we find in the Rhetoric to Alexander (which is not really addressed to
Alexander the Great, but is just called so because in manuscripts it is preceded by a fake
dedicatory letter to Alexander) in ch. 1.4, 1421b. But the topoi she mentions on p. 8 (economy,
environment, ethics, health culture, legislation, aesthetics, religion) are of a very different kind:
they refer to different subject matters, quite in the sense of Toulmin’s “fields”. Actually, the
Rhetoric to Alexander offers a quite similar list of subject matters (ch. 2.2, 1423a).
From established common ground the persuader will finally search for proofs, which,
together with common ground, will justify the standpoint. Here again, the persuader will look for
topical tools. But these will now be related to forms or types of proofs (examples, analogies,
enthymemes, inductions, expert opinions, research results etc.) rather than to contents. Does this
not bring us back to argument schemes again? Of course, Pontoppidan insists that from a
rhetorical point of view it is not the logical form of the argument that is important, but its
heuristic function. Yet in the end, one can’t help feeling that on each of these three steps of the
rhetorical model, topics means something slightly different.
Appealing as Pontoppidan’s model may be to rhetoricians, one may still play devil’s
advocate and ask if the same heuristic process might not be described by Toulmin’s model as
well. For, in Toulmin’s vocabulary, any arguer (or persuader) will first need to determine his or
her claim (standpoint). Next, he or she will try to find a convenient warrant that can reasonably
be expected to be shared by the individual persuadee (common ground). And finally, he or she
will search for data (proofs) that, together with the warrant, will justify the claim.
To use one of Toulmin’s standard examples, if it is my firm standpoint that Harry is a
British subject, and it is my aim to persuade some other person of this conviction, what I will
first look for is some general rule that I can reasonably assume to be shared by my audience or
opponent, for instance that people born in Bermuda are British subjects (which can be backed by
the argument that Bermuda is a British Overseas Territory and people born in such Territories
are British subjects). If this is granted, all I need to do is produce evidence (data) for the fact that
Harry was born in Bermuda, such as his birth certificate or his own allegation or even a friend’s
testimony.
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4. Conclusion
In sum, Pontoppidan’s observation that Toulmin’s alleged rediscovery of the topics of the Topics
still retains a distinctive dialectical and logical ring that both dismissive logicians and
enthusiastic rhetoricians have failed to notice is perfectly correct. The heuristic topical model of
argument invention and construction that she proposes instead is in itself a very appropriate and
useful tool for describing the process of building an argument from topical grounds in a
rhetorical context. It uses rhetorical vocabulary where Toulmin uses logical terms. Yet the
process of argument building and the process of persuasion are still two different processes. And
the Toulmin model can perhaps be adapted to both. It just depends how one reads it. If one reads
it top down (or left to right), it becomes a logical model for argument evaluation. But if one reads
it bottom up (or right to left), it may equally well describe the heuristic process of argument
building. Aristotle, in his Topics, too, goes both ways.
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